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A B S T R A C T
Energy-intensive processing industries (EPIs) produce iron and steel, aluminum, chemicals, cement, glass, and
paper and pulp and are responsible for a large share of global greenhouse gas emissions. To meet 2050 emission
targets, an accelerated transition towards deep decarbonization is required in these industries. Insights from
sociotechnical and innovation systems perspectives are needed to better understand how to steer and facilitate
this transition process. The transitions literature has so far, however, not featured EPIs. This paper positions
EPIs within the transitions literature by characterizing their sociotechnical and innovation systems in terms of
industry structure, innovation strategies, networks, markets and governmental interventions. We subsequently
explore how these characteristics may influence the transition to deep decarbonization and identify gaps in the
literature from which we formulate an agenda for further transitions research on EPIs and consider policy
implications. Furthering this research field would not only enrich discussions on policy for achieving deep
decarbonization, but would also develop transitions theory since the distinctive EPI characteristics are likely to
yield new patterns in transition dynamics.
1. Introduction
Energy-intensive processing industries (EPIs) are industries that
convert natural resources into basic materials through processes that
require high energy inputs. The EPIs included in this paper convert
natural resources such as iron ore, bauxite, petroleum, lime stone,
silicon dioxide and biomass into iron and steel, aluminum, chemicals,
cement, glass and paper. These are essential material building blocks
on which our society relies [1]. Globally, industry is responsible for
over 30% of all greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, of which the majority
is emitted by EPIs [2]. Over the past decades, these industries have
made significant resource and energy efficiency improvements [2,3].
However, meeting the EU 2050 emission reduction target of 80–95%
compared to 1990 requires further, extensive low carbon innovation
that is often of a radical nature [4,5]. The “well below 2C” target,
recently adopted in Paris requires EPIs to decrease emissions to zero
before 2070 [6,7]. Such deep decarbonization involves not only
changes in technology through low carbon innovation, but requires a
broader sociotechnical transition that also entails changes in user
behavior, culture, policy, industry strategies, infrastructure and science
[8–10]. However, this (deep) decarbonization transition at present
proceeds at a very slow pace [11]. To facilitate and steer this transition
process, more insight into the socio-technical drivers and barriers that
affect the transition process is needed [5,12–15].
Studies employing sociotechnical and innovation systems (ST & I
systems) perspectives have provided valuable insight into the socio-
technical drivers and barriers to the development and diffusion of new,
low carbon technologies and practices, and in understanding the lock-
in of existing regimes around established, carbon-intensive technolo-
gies. These insights have shaped public policy to more effectively
facilitate and steer sustainability transitions [16–19]. Empirical ana-
lyzes of sustainability transitions have so far, however, focused on the
energy, buildings and transport sectors and have insufficiently studied
sectors like EPIs, where such insights could help stimulate the
decarbonization transition. This study aims to position EPIs within
the transitions literature to develop such insights.
There is also a theoretical contribution to studying EPIs from an ST
& I systems perspective. The few transition studies that focused on
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EPIs, including the tile [20], paper and pulp [21,22], steel [23] and
cement and concrete industries [24,25], show that many barriers to low
carbon innovation result from distinctive EPI characteristics. The lack
of demand for cleaner basic materials, for example, may be related to
EPIs being far removed from the end-consumer, while regulatory
pressure is affected by the fear of disadvantaging domestic industries
in a highly globalized and price competitive commodity market. These
distinctive ST & I systems characteristics provide opportunities for
theoretical enrichment of the transitions literature, for example by
identifying new transition dynamics or lock-in mechanisms [25].
By positioning EPIs within the transitions literature and by
providing a research agenda, this paper broadens the empirical
application of the literature's theoretical concepts and enables future
work to develop these concepts and to formulate more effective policy
recommendations on facilitating and steering the transition in EPIs
towards deep decarbonization.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the
theoretical framework and methods. Section 3 first systematically
describes the characteristics of ST & I systems in EPIs with stylized
facts. Subsequently, Section 4 reviews, based on the limited data
available, how these stylized facts may affect decarbonization transi-
tions in EPIs and specifies an agenda that identifies fruitful venues for
further transitions research on decarbonization of EPIs. We refer to a
decarbonization transition instead of a sustainability transition, be-
cause we are primarily interested in climate related sustainability. The
paper is concluded by reflecting on the emerging field of decarboniza-
tion transitions in EPIs and by providing policy implications based on
existing knowledge.
2. Approach
2.1. ST & I systems perspective
Different approaches have been developed to study sustainability
transitions, including the multi-level perspective, strategic niche man-
agement, transitions management, and sectoral and technological
innovation systems perspectives. What these perspectives have in
common is that they study the emergence, functioning and transition-
ing of ST & I systems. The goal of these systems is to develop and
diffuse innovations and goods to meet current and future societal
demands. They are comprised of structural components that include
actors (firms, trade associations, government, research organizations,
consumers, etc.), institutions (such as norms, values and formal
policies or regulations), technologies or materiality (such as plants,
infrastructure) and the interactions between system components. The
systems can be delineated to the societal functions they fulfil (i.e. a
socio-technical system) or to specific technologies, sectors, regions or
nations (i.e. different types of innovation systems).
ST & I systems develop or transform through the co-evolution of
system components as innovation cannot take place in a vacuum [26].
Exogenous factors like climate change may trigger new societal
demands, such as environmental sustainability, that drive the existing
ST & I system to change in ways that accommodate the new societal
demand. Depending on the force of the exogenous factor and the
stability of the ST & I system, this systems change involves a transition
along existing technological trajectories (such as the development of
energy efficiency improvements) or the transition to a new system
configuration that revolves around new (low carbon) technologies [27].
Some system components or misalignment between components may
(purposefully or not) inhibit the development and diffusion of new
technologies or frustrate the transition process (so-called system
problems, failures or bottlenecks). Policy makers aiming to facilitate
or steer system growth and transition, should focus on overcoming
these system problems [28,29].
To understand technological change in EPIs, this paper distin-
guishes between incremental innovations that follow existing techno-
logical trajectories, and radical innovations that constitute new tech-
nologies. Utterback [30, p. 200] defines radical innovation as “change
that sweeps away much of a firm's existing investment in technical
skills and knowledge, designs, production technique, plant and equip-
ment”. For EPIs this definition typically means investing in novel
technologies for the basic conversion process or for changes in feed-
stocks.
To understand the dynamics of the decarbonization transition in
EPIs, this paper also distinguishes between innovations that range
from marginal to significant (described as low carbon innovation) GHG
emission reductions. These innovations may reduce emissions purpo-
sefully or not (sometimes emissions reductions are only a co-benefit,
for example of energy efficiency and recycling), as well as directly (e.g.,
emission capture) or indirectly (e.g., lower electricity demand).
We use the structural components of ST & I systems and the
aforementioned innovation typology to structure our discussion of
the factors that influence the innovation processes in EPIs (in Section
3) and of how this may affect the transition to deep decarbonization (in
Section 4).
2.2. Research design
To position EPIs within the transition literature, this paper first
characterizes the ST & I system of EPIs with stylized facts. Stylized facts
are broadly generalized and simplified representations of empirical
findings. To come to these stylized facts, we have gone through a series
of research activities aimed at co-developing and inventorying knowl-
edge between the six authors, which include experts in the field of
innovation and transition studies and experts in the field of EPIs. These
research activities are listed in Table A.1 in the Appendix and include
explorative discussions, two questionnaires and three workshops
intermitted by consecutive rounds of coordinated writing and triangu-
lation with documented sources. Such triangulation was however not
always possible due to limited and often technology or sector-specific
documentation. The years of research, including interviews and work-
ing with EPIs, by the EPI experts provides a basis for understanding
the key characteristics of these industries and their innovation dy-
namics that extends beyond what can be found based on documented
data and scientific literature. For the purpose of identifying EPI-
overarching stylized facts, this research approach is deemed more
suitable than relying on the limited existing documentation alone.
After characterizing the ST & I systems of EPIs with stylized facts,
we review the literature and documentation on EPIs to infer how these
stylized facts may influence decarbonization transitions. The literature
gaps identified in this process are formulated into a research agenda
that aims to inform and stimulate future transition studies on EPIs.
Our subsequent discussion of the EPI characteristics and implica-
tions for decarbonization transition is structured by the ST & I system
components identified as the most important; they include industry
structure, corporate innovation strategies (which are influenced by and
reinforce the industry structure), networks, basic material markets and
government policy.
3. Characterizing the ST& I systems of EPIs: stylized facts
Fig. 1 provides an overview and describes with stylized facts, the
most important actors, networks and institutions that characterize ST
& I systems of EPIs and embeds these systems within the larger value
chain. This overview shows that EPIs are very different from the
energy, buildings and transport sectors conventionally studied by the
transition literature, not only in terms of their position along the value
chain, but also in their ST & I system characteristics. The remainder of
this section further discusses the stylized facts that capture these
characteristics, followed by a reflection on their differences between
EPIs (in Section 3.6).
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3.1. Industry structure
The industrial structure of EPIs is generally characterized by strong
economies of scale and high energy and capital intensity. EPI plants are
energy intensive because the processing of raw materials typically
requires chemical conversions taking place at high temperatures or
requires energy intensive breaking of chemical bonds. Such processes
involve high fixed costs and have potential for significant energy
efficiency and organizational economies of scale, which results in large
scale processing plants that require high upfront costs [31]. These
plants are complicated to run as they are highly automated, often
produce several different qualities of products and are interlinked to
other industries. The high fixed costs need to be earned back in cyclical
markets with large variations in prices and profit margins [32],
resulting in uncertainty and long payback times and investment cycles.
High capacity utilization is important in order to recover the cost,
meaning that plants may keep operating at an overall loss as long as
prices are higher than variable production costs. Plants may also be
very profitable during periods of high demand and high prices.
Investment cycles for major reinvestments can typically range
between 20 and 40 years, but actual lifetimes may vary widely in
practice [33]. Plants are more regularly refurbished to increase
productivity and improve energy efficiency. These cycles vary for
different technologies, from 4 to 6 years for chemical facilities to 10–
15 years for glass tanks [34] and blast furnaces [35].
The scale, energy and capital intensive business case results in high
barriers to market entry. Any new entrants that wish to compete, have
to cooperate with, but more generally are absorbed by, established
players. The high sunk costs also impose barriers to exit. This is why, in
most industrialized countries, brown field investments in existing
factories are more typical to create new production capacity than
building new factories (i.e. green field investments). For example,
expansion of production capacity in US mini-mill steel plants has been
larger in existing plants than in new greenfield sites [33], while the
rapidly expanding production capacity in developing countries is
primarily found in new greenfield sites. Due to these barriers, many
EPIs are characterized by large multinationals that own plants around
the world and may have a dominant market position. The European
glass industry for example consist of more than 1000 companies but
more than 80% of the glass is produced by less than a dozen multi-
nationals [36].
3.2. Innovation strategies
Innovation strategies in EPIs are strongly shaped by industry
structure. Innovations are predominantly of a technological nature,
with traditional organizational structures and business cases. Product
innovation is only possible through downstream product differentia-
tion in specialized market segments (see Section 3.5.2) but lacks in the
bulk segments for standardized basic materials. Instead, EPIs rely
mostly on process innovation that tends to follow predefined techno-
logical trajectories through incremental innovation aimed at enhancing
productivity. Through learning by doing, the engineers operating the
factories generate incremental process innovations that trigger partial
reinvestments. Also, many of the process innovations used by EPI-
firms are outsourced to, or co-developed with, technology providers.
With the exception of chemicals, R &D investments in EPIs are low
[37], resulting in low rates of innovation that can be explained by
several interlinked factors listed in Table 1. Many radical innovations
are perceived as very risky, costly, hard to integrate, unable to compete
with the economies of scale of established technologies, and therefore
unable to overcome the valley of death that characterizes the early stage
of scaling up in the technology life cycle [38]. Radical innovations have
however developed historically, driven by enhanced productivity
[39,40], better feedstock [41] or demand-pull supported by regulation
[42,43]; contemporary examples include thin slab casting (iron and
steel) and oxy-fuel gas firing (glass). Other radical innovations are only
competitive under specific conditions (such as access to specific
resources). For example, smelt reduction processes in ironmaking
(available to date) renders coking and sintering obsolete and has a
Fig. 1. Overview of the different structural components of EPIs and their characteristics (see also Table A.2 in the Appendix).
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lower production capacity than currently found in most blast furnace-
operated integrated iron and steel plants.
3.3. Networks
Instead of in-house development, EPI companies often outsource to,
or collaborate intensively with, a small number of technology providers
on process innovation and factory upgrades. These technology providers
are specialized engineering firms that supply machinery to industrial
customers around the world. Because the technologies used by EPIs are
very specific, tend to be intellectually protected [37], are low in demand
and have long lifetimes, relations between technology providers and EPI
firms can be very strong. Analysis of a limited number of key energy-
efficient innovations in the steel and paper industry has shown that
strong, so-called mini-networks of one or a few suppliers and potential
users are essential for successful innovation [39].
Firms engage in research collaborations with competitors, technology
providers and knowledge institutes to pool ideas, knowledge and
resources because single firms typically cannot carry the R&D costs
and risks of radical innovations alone. Such collaborations may be
supported by public funds and typically take place at the national and
supranational scale (i.e. North-America, Europe or Asia). ULSAB is an
example that was instigated to collaboratively develop high strength steel
for automotive applications to compete with aluminum and plastics [45].
Although these collaborative projects are effective for developing innova-
tion at the pre-competitive stage, (inter)national competition regulations
and IPR struggles impose restrictions when commercialization nears. The
role of knowledge institutes tends to be limited at this stage as well.
Supply chains in EPIs are organized in various ways, with strongly
varying degrees of vertical integration among different EPIs and EPI
companies. Customer-supplier ties (both provider-EPI as well as EPI-
manufacturer ties) are stronger and fewer in markets for specialized
natural resources and basic materials (e.g. special ores or high-quality
steels) than in the bulk markets for commodities. Due to low profit
margins and high costs of (transporting) raw materials, EPI location has
historically been driven by resource availability (e.g. forests, coal, iron
ore, limestone) or closeness to markets (e.g., for construction materials).
Location drivers have however changed due to improved access via
international shipping of (high quality) feedstock and materials.
3.4. Government policy
Under pressure of local stakeholder groups, EPIs are often well-
regulated when it comes to local air, water and soil pollution and safety;
firms risk losing their license to operate if they do not comply with these
regulations. To safeguard economic competitiveness, the regulations for
GHG emission control are however often lenient. In many countries,
EPIs also pay lower energy taxes, compared to other energy users. Due
to their economic importance and the perceived lack of urgency for more
radical innovation, policies targeting EPIs tend to focus on incremental
innovation. This also holds true for the Best Available Techniques (BAT
Reference documents) established under the IPPC and the IED
Directives, despite their aim at “ambitious consumption and emission
levels” [46]. In some cases regulation has been able to stimulate more
substantial innovation, such as the local air pollutant regulation for the
glass industry that successfully stimulated oxy-fuel gas furnaces [47].
Finally, voluntary or negotiated agreements are used, but are criticized
for being ineffective, as industry typically agrees to little more than what
would be achieved under business as usual conditions [48].
EPIs have well-coordinated, powerful lobbying groups that tend to
take the position of their most conservative member and oppose
regulations that they perceive as threatening their (current) competi-
tiveness [25]. These lobbying groups comprise industry associations that
have close ties with policymakers in important industrial regions. Due to
the employment and other economic benefits EPIs provide in these
regions, their political influence at local/regional levels is often strong.
Public funding is important for early stage radical innovation, but
not necessary for innovations that generate significant productivity
benefits, as evidenced by the development path of the shoe press in
papermaking and thin strip casting in steelmaking [49]. Long-term
policies for radical innovations to meet societal challenges often take
form at the national and European level. They include the aforemen-
tioned public-private research collaborations as well as technology
roadmaps, i.e. shared visions on the directions of future industry
developments, which have been used in the US since the 1990s [50]
and are increasingly coordinated at the European level [51]. Such
initiatives could be a first step towards overcoming the uncertainty and
riskiness of radical innovations in EPIs.
3.5. Markets
EPIs supply their basic materials to two types of markets: basic
material markets that trade in bulk and smaller, specialized material
markets.
3.5.1. Markets for basic materials
The mass markets for bulk basic materials (i.e. commodities) like
construction steel, flat glass, cement, and polyethylene, are by far the
largest in EPIs. There is little room to differentiate in bulk materials
that strongly compete on price. With the exception of some cements,
glass-wool and some forms of paper and pulp (where long-range land
transport is costly), markets for bulk materials have a global scope. In
these global markets, fast developing and industrializing countries like
China and India pose a competitive threat to the European EPIs with
an active industrial policy favoring production volumes by offering e.g.
lower energy and capital costs and favorable market access [52].
The markets for bulk materials are often characterized by strong
price volatility. Prices and profit margins swing with international
supply-demand imbalances. This creates cyclical profit margins [32].
Because of the high fixed costs of operation and inflexible production
technologies, EPIs are unable to fully exploit these cyclical profits.
3.5.2. Markets for specialized materials
Although there are little opportunities for product differentiation on
mass markets, firms can target smaller market segments for specialized
(high quality) materials. These segments are low-volume (demand is
typically limited to one or a few discrete manufacturers), add more
value and compete less on price and more on quality, reliability and
timing of delivery (these factors may differ per EPI). Because specia-
lized demand is limited, specialized materials are often developed in
cooperation with the customer, which creates long-lasting ties based on
trust. The competitive focus on quality, reliability, timing and trust
results in reduced price-elasticity of specialized products and creates
higher and more stable profit margins.
Due to the competitive threat of emerging industries in an increas-
ingly global market for bulk materials, the specialized materials segment
has become increasingly important for EPIs in industrialized countries.
Table 1
Overview of barriers to innovation in EPIs.
Barriers to innovation in EPIs:
– Long investment cycles provide few windows of opportunity for changing technology
[33]
– The low, cyclical profit margins in EPIs reduce the availability of investment capital
and increase the return on investment times [32]
– The high costs and potential loss of market share due to failures in the production
process increase the risk perception of innovation
– Little opportunity for testing and upscaling of innovations
– The incremental improvements to core process technologies over the past decades,
often century, disadvantage radical innovations, leading to lock-in [44]
– The focus on refurbishing existing large-scale plants (so-called brown field
investment), particularly in industrialized countries, inhibits more radical
innovation
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These markets enable the leveraging of superior expertise and partial
compensation for the lower profit margins in bulk markets. Examples
are Dutch producers of solid cardboard, French producers of high
quality steel used for high speed railways and a Swedish producer of
metal powders. Innovations that enable smaller scale production in
downstream processing steps, like continuous slab and thin strip casting
(steel), may be particularly beneficial for these low-volume segments as
they may enable co-location with important specialized buyers. Finally,
material replacement competition is particularly strong in these specia-
lized segments; high-end steels, aluminum and plastics, for example,
compete for car applications [53]. Hence, ST& I system characteristics
for specialized markets differ somewhat from those for mass markets.
3.6. Sector specific deviations from the EPI characterization
The above description of EPI characteristics does not apply for
every sector to the same extent. Table A.2 in the Appendix provides an
overview of the stylized facts and to what extent the EPI experts
perceived them as applicable to each EPI sector, distinguishing
between yes (Y, indicated 125 times), no (N, 2 times) and partially
(P, 23 times) when the fact applied only under certain conditions. The
table shows that almost all stylized facts are, at least partially, perceived
Table 2
Overview of low carbon innovations per sector necessary to meet the 2050 GHG emission target, their TRL and drivers and bottlenecks to implementation.1,2
Sector: Technology Type of innovation: Incremental or Radical and technical
description
TRL Benefits of the
innovation:
Bottlenecks to diffusion of the
innovation:
All EPIs Energy efficiency I/R Reduce energy consumption through best available
technologies in steam, motor, heat pump and combined-heat
and power systemsa
All Less energy and CO2
(+)
Costs, lack of awareness and expertise
Material Efficiency
& Recycling
I/R Reduce the (primary) material intensity of supplying material
services through improved product design, product re-use,
high-quality recycling, and different business models;
includes cross-sectoral symbiosis products
All Resource efficiency
less CO2 (++/+++)
Low resource vs. high labor costs,
requires organizational and technical
innovation, lower quality materials
CCS I/R Typical end of the pipe technology, can be incremental, but
typically needs significant additional space and technology
for integration in process design, which can make it radical;
needs infrastructure to transport captured CO2
Up
to 6
Less CO2 (++/+++) Additional energy demand, costs,






R Currently under R&D (e.g. ULCOS project) needs high
integration into existing plants which might need major
changes in plant / site setup




RR Makes obsolete coke ovens, BF & BOF of conventional steel
factories
3–4 Less CO2 (++/+++) Costs, infrastructure, acceptance
Direct reduction
with H2
RR Makes obsolete coke ovens, BF & BOF of conventional steel
factories, but is combined with electric arc furnace; needs H2
supply infrastructure




Costs, infrastructure & technology
Electrowinning RRR Makes obsolete coke ovens, BF & BOF of conventional steel
factories, needs large electricity supply; technology only on
lab scale available




Only available in lab; low coal/CO2-
prices and high electricity prices
Aluminum advanced (inert)
anodes
I Avoids oxidation and consumption of anodes and the CO2
emissions resulting from this
3–4 Less CO2 (++), lower
energy demand




I Advanced furnace materials, gas turbine integration, use of
membrane technology for separation, catalytic cracking








I; R Needs conversion to bio or electricity based feedstocks (and
respective supply infrastructures); needs integration into
existing plants to use excess heat
4–6 Less CO2 (+++,
depending on RES-
share of electricity)
Costs, availability of renewable
electricity and hydrogen
Bio-based polymers RR New process technologies, new feedstock (with limited
experience at most companies), may need new platform
chemicals
4–7 Less CO2 (++) partially
new properties
Relative high costs of biomass,
economies of scale
Glass Electric melting I/R Currently in use but not for large scale applications, unclear
if electric melting technology can be up-scaled or larger
change of production process is needed
6–7 Less CO2 (+++,
depending on RES-
share of electricity)
High electricity price, size of technology
Cement Geopolymers RR Requires a new way of making cements with different input
materials and different material characteristics and costs
3–4 Less CO2, lower (++) Requires new resource streams;








I/R New separation and drying technologies are key to reduce the
energy intensity, allowing for carbon neutral operation in the
future
All Less energy and CO2
(++), lower capital and
operating expenditures
Investments in new paper machines
limited by market dynamics, small






RRR Biorefineries could potentially replace existing petro-
refineries by providing a range of bio-based chemicals and
feedstock for the paper and pulp industry
4–6 Less CO2 (+++) Feedstock availability and cost
(competition for biomass)
a See Napp et al. [59] for an overview of technologies and their energy reducing potential.
b Through better energy efficiency and utilization of by-products, this industry can potentially be carbon neutral and with the use of CCS even CO2 negative [71].
1 In Table 2 “I” signifies incremental innovation; “R” refers to more complex
innovations that do not significantly change existing production structures; “RR” implies
new technologies that require change in production facilities and systems; “RRR” refers
to innovations at very early stages of development that would radically change the
production system. Less (fossil) CO2: (+) refers to up to 33% reduction vs. reference
technology; (++) 33–66% reduction; (+++) more than 66% reduction.
2 In Table 2 the following technical abbreviations are used: BF = blast furnace; BOF =
basic oxygen furnace; CAPEX = capital expenditure; CCS = carbon capture and storage;
CO2 = carbon dioxide; RES = renewable energy sources/supply; R&D = research and
development; ULCOS = ultra low carbon steelmaking project
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as applicable to all sectors. Only the cement industry is not character-
ized by small market segments for specialized materials and is not
characterized by material replacement competition.
4. Decarbonization of EPIs
While there is potential to reduce energy intensity and GHG
emissions with commercially available processing and recycling tech-
nologies and practices (see rows 1 and 2, Table 2), meeting long term
emission targets requires a transition to low carbon process innova-
tions. These innovations enable the replacement of fossil fuels with
electricity, hydrogen or biomass (e.g., electric glass melting, hydrogen
direct reduction in steel or biofuel in lime kilns), replacement of
feedstock (such as geopolymers in cement or bio-based plastics) or
integration of CO2 emission capture (CCS) into the process design.
There is a growing literature where such technical options are assessed,
see e.g. [54–61]. Building on a review of this literature, Table 2 lists
such key low carbon innovations; the level of technical change
compared to established technologies (i.e. the radicality of the innova-
tion); the estimates of their technology readiness levels (TRL), ranging
from basic R &D to commercial diffusion (see [62]); and their
technology-specific benefits and bottlenecks to diffusion.
The remainder of this Section places the previously identified
stylized facts on EPIs in the context of the transition to deep
decarbonization by exploring how they affect the development and
diffusion of the low carbon innovations listed in Table 2. This section
furthermore identifies literature gaps that are formulated into an
agenda for advancing transitions research on EPIs.
4.1. How industry structure affects deep decarbonization
How EPI's industry structure affects deep decarbonization has been
insufficiently studied. One important implication of the industry's long
investment cycles is that new factories installed today need to be ready
to comply with 2030 and 2040 GHG emission reduction targets [33].
The scale, energy and capital intensity of EPIs and their sometimes
oligopolistic production form significant barriers to entry both for new
EPI firms [24] and for new providers of their technology. Such barriers
may inhibit transition since new entrants have been identified as
important drivers to sustainability transitions in other sectors, like
automotive [63] and energy [64].
Some radical innovations that enable processing at a lower tem-
perature and smaller scale may reduce these entry barriers. For
example, the use of thin slab casting in combination with scrap-based
mini mills, allowed the US firm Nucor to develop from a marginal steel
producer to the largest steel company in the U.S. today [65]. The
dependency on brown field investments in industrialized countries may
limit the introduction of low carbon innovations that require radical
technical changes in the existing infrastructure (see Table 2). This
dependency on brownfield investments tends to be lower in other
sectors. Related to industry structure, research agenda topics include:
– Analyze how concentrated (multinational) ownership affects low
carbon innovation
– Systematically analyze the ability of new firms to enter EPIs with low
carbon innovations
– Analyze opportunities for step-wise upscaling of low carbon innova-
tions, e.g. through niche accumulation [66]
– Systematically analyze opportunities to exploit scale-reducing effects
of radical innovations
– Analyze where opportunities lie for retrofitting existing plants with
low carbon innovations
4.2. Low carbon innovation strategies
In addition to the barriers to innovation listed in Table 1, EPI firms
have had little motivation to seriously reduce GHG emission through
low carbon innovation, given the lack of demand and limited policy
support for these innovations [49,67]. Low carbon innovation tends to
only be successful when providing economic co-benefits, like energy or
material efficiency gains [49]. Emission reduction is in those cases
often a side-effect. In cases like some low carbon cements, product
properties might even decrease. Furthermore, end-of-pipe technologies
like CCS also require changes in the core processes of most EPIs, which
raise variable and investment costs but yield no co-benefits [68]. Fuel-
replacing low carbon innovations, in turn, are for their profitability
dependent on how alternative fuel and electricity prices develop in
relation to fossil fuel prices. These and the factors we discuss in
Sections 4.3–4.5 partly explain why the low carbon technologies in
Table 2 are not breaking through commercially.
Where EPI firms perceive sustainability not as competitively
advantageous, firms in business-to-consumer sectors like automotive,
food, and energy perceive sustainability as an important means of
competitive product differentiation and of boosting brand name
perception (see e.g. [69,70]). The lack of sustainability as a means of
differentiation is thus a unique barrier to decarbonization transition in
EPIs, at least so far.
To reduce GHG emissions, EPIs currently focus mostly on incre-
mental process innovations, exploiting co-benefits with specialized
materials where possible, recycling and, to a lesser extent, changing
feedstock and fuels3 [67]. However, the tendencies to realize these
incremental innovations differ strongly between firms, as some do not
even have a well-functioning energy management system, and there-
fore lack the organizational structure to engage effectively in even
incremental low carbon innovation. In Europe, this has improved with
the monitoring, reporting and verification requirements of the EU ETS
[67].
Relevant research agenda topics related to low carbon innovation
strategies include:
– Systematically analyze rates and types of low carbon innovation and
related R &D; are firms becoming increasingly dependent on pub-
lically funded R &D?
– Analyze why some firms even lack well-functioning energy manage-
ment systems needed to engage in incremental emission-reducing
process innovations
– Analyze ways of reducing risk for low carbon innovation (such as
public procurement and long term policies)
– Systematically analyze co-benefits of low carbon innovation
– Analyze solutions to enhance investment opportunities for low
carbon innovation
4.3. How networks affect deep decarbonization
Little research has been done on the effect of the varying levels of
value chain integration on low carbon innovation, the role of technol-
ogy providers in deep carbonization, or the effect of EPI's dependency
on the fossil fuel energy system for a switch to low carbon fuels.
With the acceptance of international, long term GHG emission
reduction targets, policy makers have initiated public-private research
collaborations with firms and knowledge institutes from different
sectors. These collaborations aim to develop shared future visions on
how to competitively decarbonize EPIs and pool financing and
expertise to facilitate the development of low carbon innovation.
Such collaborations are particularly important when the low carbon
innovations are costly and bring little co-benefits. The Sustainable
Process Industry through Resource and energy Efficiency (SPIRE)
roadmap for example was established to make European process
industries “more competitive and sustainable” [23, p. 4]. Such formal
3 This is particularly the case in the concrete [81] and paper and pulp industries [91].
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collaborations can be found at different governmental levels across the
world; collaborations for clean and competitive steel for example,
include the European ULCOS, the Japanese Course50 and the US AISI
technology roadmap program [72]. Despite being often restricted to
pre-commercialization, such PPPs are generally identified as important
governance tools to stimulate and guide sustainability transitions
[73,74].
Fruitful research agenda topics include:
– Analyze how the co-dependence of EPIs and technology providers
affects low carbon innovation
– Study how network ties and value chain integration affect low
carbon innovation
– Analyze how the dependency on the fossil fuel energy system affects
deep decarbonization in EPIs
– Analyze the role of knowledge institutes and intermediary organiza-
tion in low carbon innovation
– Analyze the role of PPP and industry collaboration in technology
development and potentially diffusion
– Analyze the factors that contribute to the success of PPPs for (low
carbon) technology development
4.4. How government policy affects deep decarbonization
Economic competitiveness is the main barrier to implementing and
enforcing GHG emission control regulations in EPIs. These industries
are for example largely shielded from the direct cost of the European
Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) [51], resulting in lower emission
reductions than other targeted sectors [67,75]. Furthermore, EPIs
typically pay lower energy taxes, compared to other energy users;
German EPIs even profited from the Energiewende through lower
energy prices [76]. The regulations that are in place focus on incre-
mental innovations that also have economic benefits, examples are
energy efficiency improvements, fuel shifts and minor process im-
provements. In the Netherlands, for example, plants have to legally
adopt all energy efficient measures with a payback period of less than
five years, but this is not sufficiently enforced [77]. These regulations
drive firms to prioritize investments needed to maintain the license to
operate (e.g. pollution abatement to meet regulatory standards) over
GHG emission control.
So although government supports deep decarbonization throughout
the R &D and pilot stage, support for upscaling through a stronger
demand-pull and effective regulations are lacking [38]. Such support
and regulations are also underdeveloped in some other sectors, like
agriculture [78], but seem to be applied more in the automotive and
energy sectors, where they form important drivers to sustainability
transition [64,79,80].
The industry associations typically oppose GHG emission regula-
tions because they perceive them as cost drivers that affect their global
competitiveness and consequently employment [67]. They argue that
regulatory burdens will increase compliance costs and cause a sig-
nificant competitive disadvantage which, in a highly globalized market,
would force affected companies to move their production to other, less
regulated countries, where they might emit the same or more than they
did originally (i.e. the “carbon leakage” argument). This argument has
been influential in relaxing the EU ETS for the concrete [81], steel [82]
and pulp and paper industries [83]. In practice, the argument may only
hold for some markets for specific global, price-competitive materials,
and not for complete sectors. Lobbyists also argue that the extra
emissions of specialized basic materials are off-set during their use (e.g.
lighter and more durable steels; EPS for building insulation) and that
compliance with other environmental regulations, such as pollution
and dust prevention, requires more energy and therefore increases
GHG emissions. Finally, Wesseling and Van der Vooren [25] suggest
that industry interests use roadmaps in the cement industry to create
conservative visions on low carbon innovation that are unable to meet
2050 GHG emission targets.
Fruitful research agenda topics include:
– Analyze to what extend GHG emission regulations really inhibit
competitiveness
– Analyze the opportunities to design policies that can reduce GHG
emissions while safeguarding industry competitiveness:if allowed
under EU legislation, mandating the sales of clean materials could
protect the European market from developing countries’ low-cost,
polluting materials
1. Policy support for low carbon innovation may benefit industry, as
Mazzucato [84] showed for Danish wind turbines
2. Analyzing consumer-oriented policies that put the burden of GHG
emissions on the consumers instead of upstream sources
– Explore new types of policy instruments to support low carbon
innovation, including:
1. more effective public procurement in infrastructural projects
2. integrated push and pull mechanisms, e.g. fee-bates (i.e. bonus-
malus) to support the uptake of clean materials while pricing the
externalities
3. the commercialization of innovation from collaborative EU projects
4. (mitigated carbon price volatility created by) the current EU ETS
– Analyze to what extend expectations in industry roadmaps conflict
with scientific literature
– Analyze how to negate lobby groups’ opposition to GHG emission
regulations
4.5. How market segments affect deep decarbonization
EPIs supply other companies and are therefore less subject to
consumer pressure to become more sustainable. This pressure trickles
down the value chain when big manufacturers of end-products, such as
IKEA, decide to demand more sustainable basic materials. However,
customers of EPIs are typically not willing to pay a price premium for
cleaner basic materials, believing they cannot channel this premium to
the end-consumer, even though the net price impact is often very
small4 [85,86]. One reason is in transparency, since so far, consumer
products typically do not show the carbon footprint of the materials
they use. An analysis of the concrete industry shows that there is no
willingness to pay this price (and risk) premium; not even by public
agencies, which are the most important buyers of concrete [25].
Channeling the price premium to the end-consumer is particularly
troublesome in the price-competitive mass markets for basic materials,
but may be easier in the smaller market segments for specialized
materials with higher value-added that compete more on quality and
less on price. The distance of EPIs from the consumer and the ensuing
lack of demand for clean materials is an important inhibitor to the
decarbonization transition. Public visibility of clean products stimu-
lates demand and public pressure for these products and is found to
facilitate transition in consumer sectors, like agriculture and especially
the automotive and energy, where driving electric vehicles or installing
solar panels on rooftops signals the consumer's sustainable lifestyle
[87,88]. Research agenda topics include:
– Systematically analyze future market opportunities for low carbon
innovations:
1. In markets for bulk and specialized materials
2. What drives large consumers of basic materials (like IKEA, LEGO
or H&M) to start using more sustainable basic materials
3. Ways of enhancing transparency in the carbon footprint of basic
materials in consumer products
4 FSC paper is an exception (and closer to the end-consumer than other EPIs)
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– Cross-sectoral analysis of how globalization affects the diffusion of
low carbon innovations
– Analyze effects of material-replacement competition on sustainabil-
ity
4.6. ST & I system research topics
We also identify research topics that cover the whole ST & I system.
First, although many technology assessment studies have focused on
the emergence of low carbon technologies (e.g. those listed in Table 2),
socio-technical analyses are limited. To get a richer understanding of
the socio-technical drivers and barriers to the development and
diffusion of such emerging technologies, they could also be studied
more from technology-specific ST & I systems perspectives like the
Technological Innovation Systems perspective as is done e.g. by [24].
Second, it would be interesting to analyze the transitions of mature
EPI system configurations to deep decarbonization in their entirety.
This can be done from a multi-level perspective (e.g. Karltorp and
Sandén [21] for the pulp and paper industry) or from an innovation
systems perspective (e.g. Wesseling and Van der Vooren [25] for the
concrete industry). To understand the slow decarbonization transition,
it would be fruitful to assess if and how interdependent systemic
problems form closed feedback loops that constitute systemic lock-in;
see e.g. [25].
Once more case studies on the transition of EPIs are available,
comparative studies could identify similarities and differences in
transition processes and lock-in patterns across EPIs, adding to
existing transition pathway typologies [27,89]. Building on the sectoral
taxonomies of technical change by for example Pavitt [90], such
comparisons could also start by systematically analyzing how the role
of certain ST & I system components in transition differ across sectors.
This may lead to a better understanding of how transitions may be
governed and unfold differently across sectors.
5. Conclusions and policy recommendations
This paper concludes that the ST & I systems of EPIs are character-
ized by a set of stylized facts that set them apart from other sectors.
These stylized facts are likely to affect the deep decarbonization
transition in EPIs differently from sustainability transitions in con-
ventionally studied sectors. However, how they precisely influence deep
decarbonization remains unclear due to the limited literature on this
topic. The transitions literature on EPIs should be further developed to
better understand how deep decarbonization can be facilitated and
steered in order to meet the 2050 GHG emission targets. For this
purpose, the paper has specified a series of fruitful research topics,
which are summarized by fourteen research questions in Table 3.
A more developed understanding of decarbonization transitions in
EPIs may enrich ST & I systems perspectives. It may do so empirically
by broadening the empirical scope of the field. It may also do so
theoretically, by identifying distinctive transition dynamics and con-
stellations of systemic lock-in. The transitions field would benefit from
a systematic comparison of transition processes across a wider range of
sectors.
5.1. General policy recommendations
The identified EPI structures, innovation strategies, networks,
government policies and markets have implications for policy recom-
mendations aiming to facilitate the decarbonization transition. Based
on the assessment of stylized facts and drawing on insights from ST & I
systems studies in other sectors this paper provides, without suggesting
to be exhaustive, policy recommendations that should be complemen-
ted and refined as the field develops.
The identified lack of demand for clean basic materials necessitates
stronger market-pull policy that supports low carbon innovation to
move beyond the demonstration stage. This has proved effective in
renewable electricity, biofuels and electric vehicles. In public sectors
like infrastructure, public procurement should reward low carbon
innovation. Other demand-side policy measures include subsidizing
renewable energy for EPIs to facilitate fuel switching (e.g. German
policy); stimulating voluntary efforts (e.g. LEGO´s search for a green
plastic); labelling to create carbon foot print transparency; regulation
(e.g. banning petroleum based plastic bags); quota based systems and
feed-in-tariffs for green materials; and carbon pricing. Government
should reverse its recent trend in becoming more risk averse in its
support for innovation and should accept the risk that is inherent to the
more radical forms and early stages of low carbon innovation.
To overcome directionality failures and enable long term direction
of technology development, stakeholder-oriented, low-carbon sce-
nario, vision and pathway processes are important tools to
coordinate, direct, legitimize and learn about transitions [28]. Critical
aspects such as technology selection, co-evolution with decarbonized
energy systems, conflicting goals and interests, and policy options can
Table 3
Research agenda to further transitions research on EPIs.
Focus: Research questions:
Industry structure 1. EPIs are characterized by high levels of industrial concentration and firm ownership. How do these factors affect the transition to deep
decarbonization?
2. EPIs have high entry barriers. How does this affect the decarbonization transition and where lie opportunities for new firm entry?
3. Business cases in EPIs revolve around exploiting high scale-intensities and long investment cycles, which impairs upscaling of innovation from the
pilot phase. How can these bottlenecks be overcome to facilitate deep decarbonization?
Innovation strategies 4. Low carbon innovations without co-benefits are perceived as generating no competitive advantage. How can business cases be created for these
innovations?
5. The long-term profitability of low carbon innovations is strongly reliant on external factors. What measures and mechanisms can be identified to
reduce these uncertainties?
6. EPI firms differ significantly in their low carbon innovation strategies. How can these differences be explained?
Networks 7. EPI firms depend strongly on their technology providers for innovation. How does this affect deep decarbonization?
Government policy 8. EPIs lack GHG emission control policies because they are believed to hamper international competitiveness and due to opposition from industrial
lobby groups. What (mixes of) policy measures can be designed to effectively manage and stimulate industry efforts for deep decarbonization, while at
the same time safeguarding their competitiveness?
9. How can this policy design be shielded from overly conservative industrial lobbying pressures (including biased roadmaps)?
Markets 10. EPI markets are segmented in demand for bulk and for specialized materials. How does this segmentation affect deep decarbonization?
11. Some business end-users in the value chains of EPIs have started to demand low carbon basic materials. How does this affect low carbon innovation
in EPIs and how can this trend be supported?
12. EPIs can be far removed from the end-consumer. Can the demand from these consumers for low carbon basic materials be enhanced through
greater transparency and labelling mechanisms?
Whole system 13. What drivers and bottlenecks affect the development and diffusion of emerging low carbon technologies?
14. What systemic problems and patterns of lock-in inhibit the transition of existing ST & I-systems towards deep decarbonization in EPIs?
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be explored and assessed through such processes. Such processes can
however be dominated by industry associations, which may use them to
secure vested interests [25]. This powerful transition tool therefore
needs to be employed more in cooperation with other stakeholders.
To overcome the problem of carbon leakage (resulting from the
price-competitive, global markets for bulk basic materials) and of the
lack of investment capital, a globally coordinated policy approach
would be important, that would enable common innovation efforts
along with an acceptable differentiation of climate ambitions and an
acceptable level of domestic EPI protection between countries [6]. For
example, reorienting trade policy towards meeting societal goals, like
reducing GHG emissions while at the same fostering industrial devel-
opment would help overcome the carbon leakage argument.
Finally, the governance challenges are particularly great in EPIs
compared to other sectors, due to high mitigation costs, capital
intensity, investment cycles, global competitiveness and the lack of
co-benefits or competitive edge to clean materials. Risks and costs must
be shared between industry and governments without overcompensat-
ing industry or distorting markets in unintentional ways. Balancing
different interests will therefore be a great challenge and governing the
transition will require high levels of expertise in the evolving institu-
tional frameworks that shape innovation, state-aid, trade and goal or
challenge-oriented policies for deep decarbonization.
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Appendix
See Tables A.1 and A.2 here.
Table A.1
overview of research activities in chronological order.
Activity: Description:
Discussions Explorative individual discussions on innovation in EPIs between innovation studies scholars (dr. Joeri Wesseling and prof. Lars
Coenen) and EPI scholars (prof. Ernst Worrell, prof. Lars Nilsson, dr. Max Åhman and prof. Stefan Lechtenböhmer)
Questionnaire 1 Innovation scholars developed questionnaire 1 (79 questions on stylized facts) based on the former discussions, complemented with
factors deemed relevant from an ST & I systems perspective
Questionnaire 1 was filled out by EPI scholars
Workshop 1 1) develop a shared understanding based on the outcomes of the questionnaire and 2) discuss the most important characteristics of
EPIs to structure the ST & I systems analysis of this paper
Structuring findings Innovation scholars integrate the results in a draft document, identifying knowledge gaps
EPI scholars attempt to fill in these gaps; they edit and comment on the same document and each other's input
Workshop 2 Clarifications, critical discussions on the new inputs, addressing the remaining knowledge gaps and formulating venues for further
research
Structuring and triangulating findings Innovation scholars update the draft document, identifying final knowledge gaps and triangulating the findings using a literature review
EPI scholars again all fill in these gaps, edit and comment on the same document and each other's input, complement the literature
review
Questionnaire 2 Innovation scholars draft questionnaire 2 that forms the basis of Table A.2 (27*6 questions)
EPI scholars fill-out the questionnaire
Workshop 3 Clarifications, critical discussions on the new inputs and questionnaire 2, addressing the remaining knowledge gaps and formulating a
research agenda
Triangulating findings Innovation and EPI scholars update the draft document, triangulating the findings using a literature review and finalizing the paper and
research agenda
Table A.2,
overview of applicability of stylized facts to individual EPI sectors.
Description of characteristics of the EPI's core processes: Steel Aluminum Chemicals Cement Glass Paper &
Pulp
Industry structure scale, energy and capital intensive production Y Y Y Y Y Y
new technologies need to fit in existing factories Y Y P Y P Y
oligopolistic production P P Y P Y Y
high entry barriers Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm strategy low rates of Innovation Y Y Y Y Y Y
predominant focus on incremental, technical process innovation Y Y Y Y Y Y
most breakthrough technologies stuck at pilot stage Y Y Y Y Y Y
Innovation is risky and expensive Y Y Y Y Y Y
low profit margins inhibit investments in innovation Y Y Y Y Y Y
long investment cycles provide little opportunity for innovation Y Y P Y Y P
Networks Innovations are developed in cooperation with, or outsourced to, technology Y Y P Y Y Y
(continued on next page)
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